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 Incentives for Protecting Farm
 Workers from Pesticides
 John U. Davis, Julie A. Caswell, and Carolyn R. Harper
 Three regulatory incentive systems that may induce farmers to protect farmworkers from
 pesticide-related harm are modeled: ex post regulation via tort liability and workers'
 compensation systems, respectively, and ex ante regulation (fines) by administrative
 agencies. An empirical application examines the farmer's decision whether to comply
 with required precautions as well as penalties for noncompliance. Results indicate tort
 liability and administrative agency regulation, as practiced, provide relatively
 insignificant incentives, while a workers' compensation system, if fully experience-
 rated, may offer a more effective incentive. Nevertheless, penalties in all cases may be
 too small overall to have much influence on farmers' compliance decisions.
 Key words: farmworkers, pesticide harms, regulatory incentives, workers'
 compensation.
 Agricultural workers are generally exposed to
 more dangerous doses of pesticides in the work-
 place than consumers are in their intake of food
 (Ames, Magaw, and Gold, US EPA). The U.S.
 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
 identified worker exposure to chemicals in ag-
 riculture as a major source of human health risk.
 Data supporting this concern are also more ro-
 bust than those associated with human risk re-
 sulting from pesticide residues on food (EPA).
 Nevertheless, only limited research has been done
 on farmworker safety issues. Research on reg-
 ulatory incentive systems that may induce farm-
 ers to protect farmworkers from pesticide-re-
 lated harm is particularly sparse.
 The goal of policy makers is to establish reg-
 ulatory incentives that induce farmers to take
 precautions against pesticide risks. Previous
 work, notably that of Johnson and Ulen (1986,
 1988) and Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson, has ex-
 amined in other contexts the joint use of ex ante
 and ex post incentives provided by administra-
 tive agency regulation and the tort liability sys-
 tem respectively. Johnson and Ulen investigated
 such government-based incentives to generators
 of hazardous waste to protect community health.
 This paper is the first to apply such a model to
 the issue of farmworker safety. It is also the first
 application of workers' compensation in this
 context.
 The analysis focuses on two principal ques-
 tions. First, the farmer has a choice between
 complying, partially complying, or not comply-
 ing with regulations mandating protection of
 farmworkers from pesticide-related harm. Given
 these alternatives, what course of action would
 the risk-neutral, cost-minimizing farmer choose?
 Second, comparing the incentives provided by
 different combinations of government regula-
 tory efforts, which systems appear to be most
 effective from the policy maker's standpoint in
 inducing protective behavior?
 The Farmer's Optimization Problem
 Three incentive structures are considered, two
 of which are ex post and one ex ante. Kolstad,
 Ul n, and Johnson define ex ante policies as those
 that affect an activity before an externality is
 generated. They define an ex post policy as one
 that regulates an externality only after it has been
 generated and harm has occurred. The first ex
 post incentive considered here is a negligence
 tort liability standard. The second is experience-
 rated workers' compensation.' The single ex ante
 John Davis is a former research assistant, Julie A. Caswell is an
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 Review coordinated by Richard Adams.
 It could be argued that workers' compensation is a form of ex
 ante regulation because premiums are paid before any harm occurs.
 We consider it to be an ex post regulatory mechanism because ex-
 perience rating of premiums is based on the firm's past safety rec-
 ord.
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 structure considered is administrative agency
 regulation. We introduce these structures indi-
 vidually and then examine the farmer's com-
 plete decision problem under the joint use of all
 three incentives.
 Ex Post Incentive: Negligence Tort Standard
 Tort liability law is one means of ensuring that
 those engaged in economic activities do not
 generate external costs. We consider negligence
 rather than strict liability, because precaution
 against pesticide-related harms is normally bi-
 lateral on the part of the farmer (the potential
 injurer) and the farmworkers (the potential vic-
 tims). For example, while farmers may provide
 protective clothing, farmworkers bear part of the
 responsibility for its proper use. There are sev-
 eral sources of uncertainty in applying a negli-
 gence standard: (i) determination of the proxi-
 mate cause of injury; (ii) definition of the legal
 standard of care (adequate precaution); (iii)
 monitoring of compliance with the standard; and
 (iv) diligence of enforcement (likelihood of a
 successful lawsuit). We focus primarily on the
 implications of the last source of uncertainty.
 We assume that if the legal standard of care
 is not met, a farmer who allows workers to suf-
 fer pesticide-related harms will be liable for per-
 fect compensation, which is the monetary amount
 that leaves the injured worker indifferent be-
 tween having been harmed and never having been
 harmed at all. The following notation is used by
 Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson: let x be the level
 of the farmer's precaution in protecting farm-
 workers against such harms. In the absence of
 any liability rule (or with the existence of a no
 liability rule) and any significant costs for re-
 placing harmed workers, the rational decision
 maker is assumed to minimize costs by setting
 x equal to zero. Establishment of a negligence
 rule imposes a legal standard of care, i.e., an
 obligation to take a specified amount of precau-
 tion, x L.2 A decision maker who meets or ex-
 ceeds the court's standard (i.e., chooses x 2 xL)
 escapes liability. One who does not meet the
 standard (x < xL) is liable for compensation.
 The decision maker chooses the level of pre-
 caution that minimizes expected costs. The cost
 of precaution is repre ented by w(x). Precaution
 costs are increasing over he relevant region (w'(x)
 > 0). Exp cted arm to fa mworkers is given
by p(x)A(x), where A(x) represents the d gree of
 harm from pesticide exposure, if it occurs, and
 p(x) represents the probability that harm will oc-
 cur. Expected harm is decreasing and convex
 over the relevant region, implying that each in-
 crement of precaution results in a smaller re-
 duction in expected harm. The expected total
 social costs of the harm are determined by add-
 ing the precaution costs and the expected costs
 of harm (w(x) + p(x)A(x)).
 Policy makers seek to establish a policy that
 induces farmers to act so as to minimize total
 social costs. The farmer simply acts to minimize
 private costs, which include precaution costs and
 any expected tort liability settlements resulting
 from a failure to meet the legal standard of care.
 Her decision criterion is
 (1) min C(x) = w(x) + p(x)A(x)eL(x)
 where A(x)eL(x) is the injurer's liability condi-
 tional on harm occurring, with A(x) representing
 the degree of harm and eL(x) the probability of
 being found negligent. Under perfect compen-
 sation, the harm term, A(x), reflects both harm
 to an injured worker and the tort liability award
 or settlement required of the farmer if she were
 held negligent.
 Ex Post Incentive: Workers' Compensation
 Workers' compensation is a state-run social in-
 surance program for workers injured "out of and
 in the course of employment" (Viscusi, p. 70).
 It is another ex post incentive structure that dif-
 fers from tort liability, in that benefits are awarded
 to injured workers regardless of fault.3 Under
 many systems, a participating firm pays a fixed
 premium whether or not harm occurs. Fixed
 premium structures provide no incentive for in-
 creased precaution. However, experience-rated
 compensation systems are indexed so that firms
 pay according to their safety records.
 The cost function for a farmer subject to an
 increase in the experience-rated premium as a
 result of injuries occurring can be modeled as
 (2) C(x) = w(x) + q(x)AP(x)ewc
 where q(x) represents the probability that harm
 2 The court is not bound to find negligence only with respect to
 an existing statutory or administrative standard. It could award
 damages if it found that a farmer knew that a statutory standard
 would not provide adequate protection to workers yet took no greater
 precaution.
 3 This raises concerns about a lack of incentives for workers to
 take actions to protect themselves from harm.
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 will occur to one or more workers entering the
 field on a given day, and ewc is the likelihood
 that an injured worker will file a workers' com-
 pensation claim.4 Falling below the legal stan-
 dard will, over time, result in injuries and higher
 premiums. The premium, P(x), therefore in-
 creases with the frequency and severity of worker
 injuries. The incentive from an experience-rated
 workers' compensation system lies in the poten-
 tial change in premium, AP(x). The probability
 of any harm occurring, q(x), is multiplied by the
 positive change in premium because the pre-
 mium increases only if a worker is harmed. The
 probability of harm to one or more workers is
 used here, because we assume that premium shifts
 depend on the number of accidents, not the
 number of individuals affected. (Normally, only
 a few discrete premium levels are employed.)
 Injured farmworkers may choose not to file a
 claim because of a lack of awareness of the
 workers' compensation system or unwillingness
 to accept a reduced income (compensation ben-
 efits normally do not fully compensate lost
 wages). The probability, ewc, that an injured
 farmworker will file a workers' compensation
 claim is thus less than one.
 Ex Ante Regulation: Administrative Agency
 Fine
 The ex ante incentive considered here is a fine
 for noncompliance with safety regulations. The
 farmer wishes to minimize total costs, which
 consist of precaution costs plus the expected cost
 of any penalties for noncompliance with the
 statutory or administrative standard of care, xS.
 A farmer facing the possibility of a fine wishes
 to
 (3) min C(x) = w(x) + q(x)F(x)eF(x)
 (4) where F(x) > 0, for x < xS
 = 0, for x ? x
 F(x) is the expected noncompliance cost (i.e.,
 fine), and eF(x) is the probability of being found
 in violation of the regulation. The probability
 that harm will occur to one or more workers on
 a given day, q(x), is included because in prac-
 tice fines are not levied unless harm occurs. The
 fine is a function of the level of precaution rather
 than fixed. This is consistent with Jones' finding
 that, wh le "the majority of penalty systems his-
orically has been (and still is) lump-sum fines,
 recent statutes and the associated administrative
 rules for the most part involve penalties that are
 increasing wit  severity" (p. 79).
 Combined Effects of Ex Ante and Ex Post
 Incen ives
 The expected total cost function for a farmer
 facing all three incentive systems is
 E(TC) = w(x) + p(x)A(x)eL(x)
 + q(x)AP(x)ewc + q(x)F(x)eF(x)
 where, to summarize,
 x = Farmer's chosen level of precaution
 w(x) = Precaution cost
 p(x) = Probability of harm to a single
 worker
 A(x) = Harm from pesticide exposure
 eL(x) = Probability of a farmer being re-
 quired to pay a tort penalty
 q(x) = Probability of harm to one or more
 workers
 AP(x) = Change in workers' compensation
 premium
 ewc = Probability of an injured farm-
 worker filing a workers' compen-
 sation claim
 F(x) = Administrative agency penalty
 eF(x) = Diligence of administrative agency
 enforcement.
 In principle, the farmer may face any or all three
 incentive systems included in this expression. In
 practice, there are significant variations among
 incentive systems across states. This is because
 administrative agency regulation begins at the
 federal level but is enforced by the states, while
 workers' compensation and tort liability systems
 are based at the state or local level.
 Application: Massachusetts Apple
 Production
 The safety incentive model is applied to the in-
 centives facing Massachusetts apple growers.
 Specifically, we consider compliance with the
 protective clothing requirements for workers en-
 tering fields during the EPA-mandated no reen-
 try interval for the pesticide Guthion. Numerous
 difficulties are encountered in quantifying the
 complex incentive system modeled in the pre-
 4 The opposite case, where the experience-rated premium de-
 creases as a result of a good safety record, is not addressed here.
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 vious section. Simplifying assumptions are made
 throughout in order to facilitate this task.
 The hypothetical cost-minimizing farmer op-
 erates a 75-acre farm with a corresponding an-
 nual payroll of $68,949.45. This is the mean
 payroll in the lowest payroll class that is expe-
 rience-rated by the Workers' Compensation
 Rating and Inspection Bureau of Massachusetts.
 The size of operation determines the farmer's
 workers' compensation premium and the num-
 ber of workers in the field during a given pe-
 riod.
 The principal apple orchard activity occurring
 in the northeast during July and August, when
 Guthion is applied, is summer pruning. This ac-
 tivity requires about 25 labor hours per mature
 acre, so a 75-acre orchard requires approxi-
 mately 1,875 hours. Summer pruning is gener-
 ally performed from July 15 to August 31, a pe-
 riod of about 41 work days given a six-day work
 week. A 75-acre farm thus requires an average
 of 4.573 employees per day for a 10-hour work
 day (Autio). The Guthion 35% WP label states
 that workers must "not enter treated areas for
 24 hours after application unless protective
 clothing is worn, as described in the product la-
 beling." The mandated clothing is as follows:
 "wear . . . a protective suit of one or two pieces
 that covers all parts of the body except the head,
 hands, and feet. Wear chemical resistant gloves
 and chemical resistant shoes, shoe coverings, or
 boots" (Mobay Corporation).
 If summer pruning takes place during the
reentry interval, he pr caution cost per-day to
 fully satisfy the label requirements is $2.38 per
 worker; this is the total per-day cost of a cov-
 erall, latex gloves, and rubber boo s." The total
 average precaution cost is thu  $10.88 (for 4.573
 workers) to comply fully and zero otherwise.
 Througho t this example, the farmer either takes
 full precau ion or no precaution, so that the level
 of precaution, x, equals xs, the administrative
 standard, or zero (table 1).6
 Tort Liability Exposure
 Under a negligence tort standard, a fa mer tak-
 ing reasonable precaution to minimize the rob-
 ability of harm to farmworkers will not be held
 liable for any harm. In practice, the tort system
 is better suited to handle harms connected with
 "discrete, easily traceable causes" (Viscusi, p.
 5 Per day costs are calculated by dividing the retail price of the
 protective clothing by its usable life in days. For example, a Tyvek
 regular-duty coverall has a retail price of $4.05 and a manufactur-
 er's recommended usable life of five days for a per day cost of
 $0.81.
 6 Partial compliance strategies are also possible. Compared to full
 compliance, precaution costs decrease while regulatory costs in-
 crease. The opposite is the case when partial is compared to no
 compliance. Given the lack of data on the relationship between de-
 gree of compliance and size of regulatory penalties, we did not
 attempt to quantify any partial compliance strategies.
 Table 1. Data Summary
 Variable Mathematical expression Values
 Precaution cost w(x) $10.88
 0.00
 Probability of harm p(x) 0.25
 Harm per worker $2,044.12
 1,000.00
 571.43
 Harm per average number of workers (4.573) A(x) $9,347.76
 4,573.00
 2,613.15
 Likelihood of tort settlement eL(x) 0.008300
 0.000830
 0.000083
 Probability of any harm q(x) 0.7317
 Change in workers' compensation premium AP(x) $526.00
 Probability of worker filing workers' compensation claim ewc 0.20
 Administrative agency fine F(x) $7,000.00
 4,250.00
 1,500.00
 Diligence of enforcement eF(x) 0.06225
 0.00623
 0.00062
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 70). Thus our data pertain to cases of acute in-
 jury arising from pesticide exposure. We as-
 sume that the court's standard of care corre-
 sponds to the pesticide label requirements, so
 that xs = XL. Expected harm levels are deter-
 mined by multiplying representative tort liabil-
 ity settlements by a probability of harm, defined
 as the probability that a farmworker entering a
 field without protective clothing during the
 reentry interval will suffer pesticide-related in-
 jury.
 Factors such as time elapsed since spraying,
 dosage of pesticide sprayed, type of work being
 performed, and the innate susceptibility of in-
 dividuals to poisoning determine the probability
 that a given worker falls ill as a result of pes-
 ticide exposure. Very little data exist on the pro-
 portion of workers harmed who enter a Guthion-
 treated field within the reentry interval. In one
 recorded California case involving the spraying
 of Guthion on peaches, 6 of 24 workers fell ill
 after entering an orchard recently sprayed with
 Guthion (Dervin). In the absence of other evi-
 dence, we assume here that the probability of
 harm (p(x)) is 25% for each exposed worker
 (table 1).
 No precedents could be found for public tort
 liability awards or settlements granted in Mas-
 sachusetts for pesticide-related harm to farm-
 workers. The few precedents that exist nation-
 wide, all involving acute illness, are used to
 estimate the potential cost of a lawsuit for farm-
 ers who fail to meet standards of precaution. Total
 settlement awards are divided by the number of
 workers involved to yield an estimate of per
 worker harm. For a low estimate, we use the
 $4,000 settlement in the Chacon v. Miller case
 (No. 84-4017, C.D. Ill. Sept. 1986), where
 seven farmworkers were involved for a calcu-
 lated harm per worker of $571.43 (Migrant Le-
 gal Action Program 1987). For a middle-range
 estimate, we use the $5,000 settlement in the
 Ramirez v. Adamucci case (No. 85-2374, D.N.J.
 1986), where five workers were involved for a
 per worker harm of $1,000 (Migrant Legal Ac-
 tion Program 1987). For a high estimate, we
 use the Flores v. Mobay settlement (Civ. No.
 84-20025, N.D. Cal., Sept. 15, 1983). Be-
 cause that settlement required four defendants,
 including the farmer, to pay a total of $278,000
 (Migrant Legal Action Program 1985), we as-
 sess the farmer's total liability at $69,500. There
 were 34 injured farmworkers bringing the per
 worker award to $2,044.12 (table 1).
 When these values are multiplied by p(x), the
 probability of harm to each farmworker, and by
 4.573, the average number of workers exposed
 each day, the products represent a range of val-
 ues for expected harm to the work crew. These
 values are multiplied by eL(x), the probability
 that a farmer is found negligent, to obtain the
 expected tort liability cost. Quantifying eL(x) is
 difficult. As few as 1% of all pesticide-related
 injuries in agriculture are reported (Coye, p. 364).
 It is widely believed that few farmers who could
be held liable for pesticide-related harms are ac-
 tually brought to court, and even fewer are found
 liable for damages or choose to settle. However,
 no quantitative estimates of this proportion are
 available. Nor are there sufficient cases to judge
 whether differences exist between settlements
 awarded by judges and by juries.
 A range of three probabilities is used to es-
 timate the likelihood that a farmer is held liable
 or chooses to make a cash settlement with plain-
 tiffs out of court. Each probability is the product
 of two terms-the probability the farmer will be
 sued once harm occurs, and the probability he
 will be forced to pay damages or a settlement
 once a suit is brought:
 eL(x) = p(suitlharm) p(paymentlsuit).
 According to sources familiar with farmworker
 tort liability suits, chances of a cash settlement
 or award are high when a suit is brought. The
 principal barrier to farmworker compensation is
 the very low probability that a suit will be brought
 (Lightstone). No estimates of this probability are
 available, however. Based on conversations with
 legal professionals at the Migrant Legal Action
 Fund and the California Rural Legal Assistance
 Fund, we estimate the probability of payment
 given a suit at 83%. This value is in turn mul-
 tiplied by a range of values that reflect the low
 but unknown probability that a suit will be
 brought: 0.01, 0.001, and 0.0001. Overall, the
 range of probabilities that a farmer will pay any-
 thing for pesticide-related harms to farmworkers
 are 0.0083, 0.00083, and 0.000083 (table 1).
Workers' Compensation
 The farmer's expected change in workers' com-
 pensation costs is q(x)AP(x)ewc, where q(x) is
 the probability of any harm occurring (one or
 more workers being injured), AP(x) is the change
 in the farmer's experience-rated premium re-
 sulting from a successful claim, and ewc is the
 probability of a farmworker filing a claim. It is
 assumed that a filed claim will be successful,
 because this is usually the case.
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 The annual payroll assumed here is at ap-
 proximately the eightieth percentile among
 Massachusetts orchards. Depending on his re-
 cent loss experience (the number and magnitude
 of claims), such a farmer pays one of three an-
 nual premiums: $6,718, $5,666, or $4,567 (Liu).
 We assume the farmer is initially paying the me-
 dium level premium, but would be bumped to
 the upper premium if the insurer were forced to
 pay more than one additional worker claim. This
 closely models the actual Massachusetts work-
 ers' compensation system. The farmer is con-
 cerned with the per incident increase in his pre-
 mium of $526.
 The probability that one or more workers is
 harmed, q(x), is one minus the probability that
 no one is hurt. Assuming that the probability of
 harm for each worker is independent and that
 the average number of workers (4.573) is in the
 orchard,
 q(x) = 1 - [1 - p()]4.573.
 With p(x) set at 0.25, q(x) equals 0.73 (table
 1).
 We assume that no uncertainty exists in the
 granting of workers' compensation benefits but
 that uncertainty does exist over whether an in-
 jured farmworker will file a claim. According
 to Wilk (1986), "even in states where workers'
 compensation covers agricultural workers, many
 farmworkers do not understand that medical ex-
 penses and lost wages due to illness or injury
 are due them" (p. 109). Other factors may deter
 an injured farmworker from filing a claim; for
 example, failure to link the illness symptoms to
 pesticide exposure, fear of retaliation by the em-
 ployer, and preferring to work rather than ac-
 cept the lower compensation associated with
 temporary disability (Ellenberger). One expert
 on farmworker health suggests that the percent-
 age of farmworkers filing claims as a result of
 injury, ewc, is significantly below 50% (Wilk
 1991). We use a rough estimate of 20% for this
 probability (table 1).
 Administrative Agency Regulation
 The EPA, which is charged with administering
 and enforcing the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
 and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), delegates much
 of the enforcement to state governments. Ac-
 cording to the Enforcement Division of the Pes-
 ticide Bureau, Massachusetts Department of Food
 and Agriculture, a farmer found violating laws
 regulating the use of pesticides will normally first
 be warned. If a letter or administrative order fails
 to stop the v olation, the Department of Food
 and Ag iculture can either take action to sus-
 pend he farmer's license to apply pestici es or
 pursue civil or criminal prosecution. In Massa-
 chusetts, legal cases involving defendants whose
 actions resulted in harm to farmworkers are ex-
 tremely rare, but examples exist of firms being
 prosecuted for violating administ ative orde s in
 other ways. We assume the penalties for these
 viol tions are roughly equivalent to those that
 would be assessed when farmworkers are harmed.
 These fines have ranged from $1,500 to $7,000
 in criminal cases and have gone as high as
 $30,000 in civil cases. Because the $30,000 fine
 was levied u der excep ional circumstances,
 $7,000 s used as a igh estimate of potential
 administrative agency fines, and $1,500 as a low
 estimate. The mean of these two potential pen-
 alties, $4,250, serves as a middle range estimate
 (table 1).
 We make the following assumptions about the
 administrative agency component of the model:
 First, fines vary according to the egregiousness
 of the violation, so F'(x) < 0 for x < xs. Sec-
 ond, if the farmer meets or exceeds the legal
 standard, no fine is levied. Third, because farm-
 ers are highly unlikely to be caught violating a
 mandated reentry interval unless farmworkers
 are harmed (Wilk 1991), we assume that a fine
 for a violation is levied only if harm occurs. The
 probability of harm occurring to one or more
 workers is q(x), as before. Fourth, according to
 experts in litigation on behalf of farmworkers,
 administrative agency fines against farmers whose
 isuse of pesticides results in harm are 5-10
 times more common than tort liability awards or
 settlements (Migrant Legal Action Program
 1991). We specify that fines are 7.5 times more
 probable than settlements or awards (eF = 7.5e,).
 This yields administrative agency enforcement
 probabilities of 0.06225, 0.00623, and 0.00062
 (table 1).
 Comparative Compliance Incentives Under
 Different Regulatory Regimes
 The influence on farmer decision making of in-
 teractions among these incentive systems can now
 be examined by comparing the cost of precau-
 tion that fully meets the legally-mandated stan-
 dard of care with the expected cost of noncom-
 pliance. Because precise data for many variables
 do not exist, the value ranges employed repre-
 ent informed approximations and results are
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 simulations of the actual incentives provided by
 different incentive combinations. The inquiry is
 centered on two principal questions. First, given
 existing incentive structures, what course of ac-
 tion can farmers be expected to take? Second,
 from a policy maker's viewpoint, what regula-
 tory structures are most effective in eliciting
 farmer compliance with worker protection reg-
 ulations?
 We examine three combinations of incentives
 that reflect existing state systems. Under case 1,
 a farmer is subject to all three types of incen-
 tives: i.e., may be held negligent in a tort lia-
 bility suit and required to pay damages, must
 pay an experience-rated workers' compensation
 premium, and is subject to an administrative
 agency fine. In case 2, the workers' compen-
 sation premium exempts the farmer from any
 exposure to tort liability damages, but he still
 may be fined. This case reflects the fact that in
 many states workers covered by workers' com-
 pensation may not sue employers for work-re-
 lated injuries. Case 3 is the opposite situation,
 where the farmer is not covered by workers'
 compensation but may be held liable for tort
 damages and is subject to fines. A spreadsheet
 program facilitated the examination of combi-
 nations of incentive systems for the penalty val-
 ues and probabilities shown in table 1. Com-
 binations of these values generated 64 cost
 scenarios (one compliance and 63 noncompli-
 ance) that permit a sensitivity analysis examin-
 ing a wide range of regulatory policies.7
 Scenarios
 Case 2 is the most accurate reflection of the cur-
 rent incentive system in Massachusetts, because
 the required workers' compensation coverage
 normally precludes workers from seeking re-
 course through tort liability suits. Nevertheless,
 farmworkers who are insured under workers'
 compensation can sue if they can prove an in-
 tentional tort. Furthermore, a farmer could il-
 legally choose not to be covered under workers'
 compensation (thus restoring the right of work-
 ers to resort to tort liability). Thus, cases 1 and
 3 also have relevance in Massachusetts. All three
 cases are applicable in other states as well.
 Expected costs under all noncompliance sce-
 narios are compared with the precaution costs
 of provi ing adequate protective clothing. Un-
 der the assumption that taking the EPA-man-
 dated level of precaution protects the farmer from
 both negligence awards and administrative fines,
 he farm r's compliance cost per work day is
 $10.88, the cost of protective clothing for an
 average 4.573 workers.
 Ranges fo  the expected total cost of noncom-
 pliance for cases 1, 2, and 3 are shown in table
 2. The expected total costs are calculated using
 in turn the low, middle, and high values of the
 relevant variables. The highest expected total
 noncompliance cost occurs when the farmer is
 ubject to all three forms of regulation (case 1)
 at the highest penalties and probabilities. In this
 case, the farmer's expected total noncompliance
 cost is $415.21. The lowest expected total non-
 compliance cost occurs in case 3, where the
 farmer faces tort liability and administrative
 agency fines but does not pay a workers' com-
 pensation premium. Using the lowest penalties
 and probabilities, the expected noncompliance
 cost is only $0.73.
 The risk-neutral grower will comply with reg-
 ulations whenever the expected noncompliance
 cost exceeds $10.88. Of the nine scenarios shown
 in table 2, only the low range scenario for case
 3 results in the farmer choosing not to comply
 with regulations. These examples are represen-
 ta ive of the full range of 63 noncompliance sce-
 narios, 12 of which have expected costs less than
 $10.88. All occur under case 3, where the farmer
 faces only tort liability and administrative agency
 regulation. The farmer chooses to disregard safety
 regulations only when not subject to an expe-
 rience-rated workers' compensation premium.
 The lowest expected total noncompliance cost
 among case 1 and 2 scenarios is $77.66, over
 seven times the compliance cost. Thus farmers
 covered under experience-rated workers' com-
 pensation would always comply with safety reg-
 ulations.
 Implications of Preliminary Results
 These results suggest that farmers would nor-
 mally choose to comply with reentry regula-
 tions. This runs counter to the common asser-
 tion that existing regulations give inadequate
 incentives for farmworker protection (see, for
 example, Dullinger). Possible reasons for this
 discrepancy are, first, that many states do not
 require workers' compensation coverage for
 farmworkers and thus do not have the strong in-
 centives that result from Massachusetts' expe-
 7 The complete results for all 64 scenarios can be obtained from
 the authors.
 914 November 1992 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
 Table 2. Ranges of Expected Total Noncompliance Costs for Cases 1, 2, and 3
 Data values
 Variable Low medium High
 Case 1 (Tort liability, Workers' compensation, and administrative agency regulation)
 A(x) $2613.15 $4573.00 $9347.76
 eL(x) 0.000083 0.00083 0.0083
 AP(x) $526.00 $526.00 $526.00
 F(x) $1500.00 $4250.00 $7000.00
 e (x) 0.00062 0.00623 0.06225
 E(TC) $77.71 $97.30 $415.21
 Case 2 (Workers' compensation and administrative agency regulation; no tort liability)
 AP(x) $526.00 $526.00 $526.00
 F(x) $1500.00 $4250.00 $7000.00
 eF(x) 0.00062 0.00623 0.06225
 E(TC) $77.66 $96.35 $395.81
 Case 3 (Tort liability and administrative agency regulation; no workers' compensation)
 A(x) $2613.15 $4573.00 $9347.76
 eL(x) 0.000083 0.00083 0.0083
 F(x) $1500.00 $4250.00 $7000.00
 eF (X) 0.00062 0.00623 0.06225
 E(TC) $0.73 $20.32 $338.23
 rience-rated system. Second, precaution costs
 considered are inco plete. Protective clothing
 may be considered inconvenient, for example,
 or might reduce worker productivity. If this were
 the case, the decision "threshold" would be
 higher, possibly resulting in a greater proportion
 of the scenarios having noncompliance as the
 rational choice.
 Third, farmers may be more likely to violate
 reentry intervals that are longer than the one day
 used in this application. Compliance costs are
 likely to increase significantly with longer in-
 tervals, either in the form of protective clothing
 cost or in such costs as crop loss. For example,
 while the EPA-mandated and Massachusetts
 reentry interval for Guthion sprayed on apples
 is 24 hours, California law requires a 14-day in-
 terval (Wilk 1986, p. 63). The longer interval
 would provide far greater incentives to not com-
 ply. In addition, compliance could take forms
 other than use of protective clothing when en-
 tering the field. With a short interval, for ex-
 ample, little opportunity cost may be involved
 in waiting it out, which would not be the case
 with longer intervals. These latter two situations
 could involve considerably higher precaution
 costs and, ceteris paribus, greater incentives to
 not comply. On the other hand, it should be noted
 that noncompliance costs may exist outside those
 modeled here, such as costs of replacing injured
 workers.
 Relative Effectiveness of Incentive Systems
 Comparison of expected total noncompliance
 costs for cases 1 and 2 reveals very similar costs
 (table 2). For example, using medium data val-
 ues, the elements of the expected cost function
  the same except that case 2 does not include
 expected tort liability penalties. Expected total
 cost is $97.30 in case 1 and $96.35 in case 2,
 a difference of only $0.95. Only at the highest
 likelihood of settlement and harm per farm does
 tort iability offer much additional incentive to
 protect farmworkers beyond that provided by
 workers' compensation and administrative agency
 regulation.
 This point is further explored in table 3, which
 shows the contribution to expected total non-
 compliance cost of each incentive system in case
 1, where all three systems are in effect. Using
high data values, for example, expected total
 noncompliance cost is $415.21. Of this, $318.84
 is the expected administrative agency fine, $76.97
 is the expected increase in the workers' com-
 pensation premium, and $19.40 is the expected
 tort liability penalty. Thus administrative agency
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 Table 3. Contribution of Different Incentive Systems to E(TC) of Noncompliance for Case 1
 Data values
 Low medium High
 Dollar contribution
 Tort liability $0.05 $0.95 $19.40
 Workers' compensation $76.97 $76.97 $76.97
 Administrative agency $0.68 $19.37 $318.84
 Total $77.71 $97.30 $415.21
 fines contribute the most to expected noncom-
 pliance costs in this case. Because the expected
 increase in the workers' compensation premium
 remains the same across scenarios (the associ-
 ated probabilities do not change), it is more im-
 portant in scenarios with lower probabilities of
 tort liability or administrative agency penalties.
 For example, using low data values, the ex-
 pected total noncompliance cost is $77.71, of
 which $76.97 is associated with workers' com-
 pensation, $0.05 with tort liability, and $0.68
 with administrative agency fines. Thus when low
 and middle range probabilities and penalties are
 in effect, workers' compensation provides farm-
 ers with the largest compliance incentive, fol-
 lowed by administrative agency regulation and
 tort liability.
 Implications of Altering the Probabilities
 Because accurate probability data are scarce, we
 perform a sensitivity analysis to examine the ef-
 fects of different probabilities on compliance in-
 centives. Many factors influence the probability
 (p(x)) that a worker becomes ill when exposed
 to a pesticide, including variability in human re-
 sponse to such exposure. The initial analysis set
 p(x) equal to 0.25. Here we examine the effects
 of doubling this probability to 0.5 and halving
 it to 0.125.
 Raising the probability of harm from 0.25 to
 0.5 has little impact upon the farmer's original
 compliance decision, because it further in-
 creases expected total noncompliance costs,
 which are already high relative to compliance
costs. The expected cost using middle range data
 values for case 1 increases from $97.30 to
 $128.04, while for cases 2 and 3 it increases
 from $96.35 to $126.15 and from $20.32 to
 $27.26, respectively. The increase in probabil-
 ity of harm does lift the expected cost of one of
 the case 3 scenarios above $10.88, changing the
 farmer's choice from noncompliance to compli-
 ance. When the original probability of harm falls
 to 0.125, noncompliance costs under each case
 drop significantly. However, overall the farmer
 chooses not to comply in the same number of
 cases (12 out of 63) as in the baseline results.
 The probability that an injured farmworker will
 file a workers' compensation claim (ewc) is un-
 certain. We initially assumed a probability of
 0.2 and here examine the implications of using
 probabilities of 0.4 and 0.1. Doubling the prob-
 ability of a claim being filed to 0.4 for cases 1
 and 2 greatly increases the mean expected non-
 compliance cost, but does not affect the farm-
 er's compliance decision. Substituting a value
 of 0.1, the compliance decision is unchanged
 but the expected costs are considerably lower
 for cases 1 and 2. Holding the other original val-
 ues constant, ewc would have to drop below 0.026
 Table 4. The Effect on Noncompliance Costs of Changing Original Probability Estimates
 Case Ia Case 2a Case 3a
 Noncompliance costs
 Original results $97.30 $96.35 $20.32
 p(x) = 0.5 $128.04 $126.15 $27.26
 p(x) = 0.125 $60.65 $60.18 $12.57
 ewc = 0.4 $174.27 $173.32 $20.32
 ewc = 0.1 $58.81 $57.86 $20.32
 p(x) = 0.125 and
 ewc = 0.1 $36.31 $36.14 $12.57
 a Medium data values scenario.
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 before the farmer would choose not to comply
 with requirements for protective clothing. As the
 farmer becomes more certain that noncompli-
 ance resulting in injury will not be reported, he
 becomes more likely to not comply.
 Simultaneously halving the probability of harm
 and of a worker filing a workers' compensation
 claim leaving all other values the same signifi-
 cantly lowers the expected noncompliance cost.
 The expected cost for case 1 drops to $36.31
 (see table 4), while the corresponding values for
 cases 2 and 3 are $36.14 and $12.57. Even with
 these changes, the farmer chooses noncompli-
 ance in the same number of cases as in the base-
 line results. Thus the compliance findings are
 insensitive to changes in the underlying proba-
 bilities used in the application.
 Summary and Conclusions
 This paper examines policies aimed at providing
 economic incentives for farmers to protect farm-
 workers exposed to pesticides. We extend pre-
 vious work by incorporating incentives provided
 by workers' compensation along with those from
 tort liability and administrative agency regula-
 tion. We make the first application of this
 framework to the area of worker safety. The
 framework allows analysis of interactions be-
 tween ex ante and ex post regulation systems,
 to examine in particular whether the systems are
 complements or substitutes. Quantification of
 farmers' incentives is made difficult by the lack
 of adequate data on pesticide-related illness
 and injury among farmworkers, and on the en-
 forcement probabilities associated with tort
 liability, workers' compensation, and adminis-
 trative agency regulation. The empirical analy-
 sis therefore takes the form of a set of simula-
 tions reflecting the range of possible incentives
 facing a Massachusetts apple grower.
 One important factor limiting the impact of
 regulatory incentives is underreporting of injury
 and illness among farmworkers. Some states have
 begun requiring medical doctors to report all such
 illnesses or injuries they encounter. This is a step
 toward greater protection, but it assumes both
 that a farmworker sees a physician and that either
 the farmworker or the physician is able to link
 the symptoms to pesticide exposure. Ascertain-
 ing the degree of risk faced by workers is also
 problematic. Taking into account such factors as
 the number of hours since a pesticide applica-
 tion, climatic conditions, age, gender, and health
 of a given worker, it may be theoretically pos-
sible to derive a probability distribution for the
 risk lev l. In practice, however, the task is
 daunting. T e enforcement probabilities and the
 probability that a farmworker files a workers'
 compensation claim should also in principle be
 calculable. The paradox is t at these probabili-
 ties can be known only if one kn ws the number
 of ca es not nforced or not reported. Such con-
 sideratio s underscore the difficulty in obtaining
 reliable data.
 Despite ata problems, the empirical analysis
 is instructive on several points involving the
 regulation of farmworker safety. First, the like-
 lihood that a recalcitrant farmer will be penal-
 ized by the tort liability or administrative agency
 regulation systems is generally low because of
 low probabilities of suits being brought and of
 enforcement. Therefore, a system of complete
 experience-rated workers' compensation, mak-
 ing the employer bear the total costs of work-
 related harm to employees, may offer the most
 effective incentive to farmers to protect farm-
 worker health. In contrast, where workers' com-
 pensation is imperfectly experience-rated, firms
 face considerably lower expected noncompli-
 ance costs and, consequently, lower incentives.
 A farmer facing a fixed workers' compensation
 premium is offered no incentive at all to protect
 farmworker health.
 Second, for tort liability to have a significant
 deterrent effect on negligent behavior, the prob-
 ability of a suit being brought would have to be
 significantly higher, the amount of settlements
 and awards would have to increase, or both. The
 assumption made here, that tort liability settle-
 ments and awards perfectly compensate farm-
 workers for harm they suffer, may be too strong,
 given the low per worker settlements observed
 in actual cases.
 Third, the analysis suggests that unless the
 probability of enforcement is relatively high,
 administrative agency regulation is far inferior
 to an experience-rated workers' compensation
 system in providing farmers with incentives to
 nsure farmworker safety. Also of interest is the
 relationship between harm occurring and ad-
 ministrative agency fines being levied. To pro-
 vide significant protection, regulations should
 penalize safety violations wherever they occur,
 not only after harm has been done.
 Fourth, while this analysis showed incentive
 systems that usually induce compliance, the costs
 associated with workers' compensation domi-
 nated most scenarios. In themselves, tort liabil-
 ity and administrative agency regulation pro-
 vided insignificant incentives to protect
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 farmworkers. Regulatory contexts not involving
 experience-rated workers' compensation may,
 therefore, yield quite different conclusions about
 the overall likelihood that farmers will take pro-
 tective measures. This point is crucial when one
 considers that in many states farmworkers are
 not protected by workers' compensation laws.
 Finally, even where noncompliance costs are
 highest, with all three incentive systems in ef-
 fect, these costs are less than 1% of payroll,
 which in turn represents only a portion of the
 farmer's total production costs. Thus the pen-
 alties associated with the regulatory systems
 studied may be in general too small to have much
 influence on farmers' compliance decisions.
 [Received September 1991; final revision
 received April 1992.]J
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